Политическа и публична комуникация
Political and Public Communication
DOI 10.55206/TPBW9900
Theodoros Vaniotis
New Bulgarian University
E-mail: theodoros.vaniotis@gmail.com
Abstract: The electoral successes of far-right parties across Europe over the past few years have been touted as a figurative wave threatening to sweep across the democratic order through EU member states. This political phenomenon has perhaps been in the making for decades and it enhances manifestation in political sphere changing political communication on the international and institutional levels and the current paper makes use of the opportunity to point at some key aspects of the formation of a newer far-right political elites. Also outlined are the clashes between said elites and the status quo elites as well as the role of the key tool that both sides implement – political communication, a tool for reaching and influencing voters. The methodology includes an analysis of selected information from official European Union documents, as well as media publications and commentaries, using the desk research method. The hypothesis is that, at the communicative and linguistic levels, right-wing parties and elite parties perform an informative function for voters, party members, and institutions. At the same time, the use of expression and connotation contributes to heterogeneity in political discourse within the European Union, which does not facilitate the realization of a persuasive function among voters in the Member States.
Keywords: political communication, political elites, political dominance, European Union
Introduction
Political systems, in their particular way, have the intriguing quality to somehow breed discontent out of apparent order. While there can be no dispute over the theoretical and practical benefits of a multilevel encompassing integration project, such as the highly successful European Union, political realities do in some regards clash with the somewhat utopian views of the bureaucratic elites in Brussels. In any system allowances for discontent and political opposition should be made, but the media have been sounding the proverbial alarm over the past few years about the rise of the political far-right across EU member states. [1] What is alarming in the particular case is not the rise itself, but arguably its scope. Because, as it will be made plain in the text to follow, successes by the far-right are ever-present. What might be considered a newer development is arguably the scope of their successes as of late.
The question of the far-right political movement during and after the Cold War period is undoubtedly interesting in its own right, but what is most important to the text at hand is that, said period is a sort of starting point for the preparation of a new and more able far-right elites. [2] In this sense, one of the positions in the paper at hand will be that the current conflict between the established elites in Brussels and these newer far-right elites is a clash between political elites in a bid for political dominance within the EU itself. Normally, the political far-right is more of a heterogenic political phenomenon, due to the vast pluralism of values and political views it contains within itself [3], but unfolding trends suggest a sort of consolidation between different types of far-right parties in the realm of supranational interest. However, such partnerships might also be rather situational and unstable formations. [4] Nonetheless, we now currently have not one or two, but three far-right and nationalistically minded political groups within the European Parliament – the ‘Patriots for Europe’ (PfE) group [5], the ‘European Conservatives and Reformists’ (ECR) group and the ‘Europe of Sovereign Nations’ group (ESN).
Of course, this is a highly intriguing and multilayered political phenomenon. A way to start approaching the issue at hand is being proposed in the following text – the most productive way may well be to view the political communication aspects of the unfolding occurrence and how it has been addressed, as well as how it could be addressed in order to achieve lasting results. In the final conclusions of the paper there will be some suggested methods as to what steps could lead to a more productive outcome as regards to political solutions of the issue of an all-encompassing far-right threat to the political status quo.
There is an apparent disconnect in the process of integration as a whole within the entirety of the European Union. More precisely, there has been a greater focus on market integration and harmonization of practices and norms between Member States, but not much effort in the realm of better understanding the political processes within the EU itself. The whole institutional mechanism is in a way considered foreign and unintelligible to people en masse. The specific political tool for these processes that the current paper will attempt to prove as the key instrument for facilitating these processes is political communication itself. And the problems that we face as an entire European Community, as well as independent communities within the EU, is that a failure of effective and productive political communication brings about the rise of the far-right across EU Member States. The described disconnect between people and institutions is being fed by a perceived disinterest on the part of the institutions in Brussels to openly discuss issues on economic policies, migration policies and so on. On the other hand, far-right parties appear to be able to pinpoint and adapt to the public’s unease and seemingly to address their concerns – a problematic situation, because no actual constructive political action is undertaken, apart from a bid for more political power and a better position in the political hierarchy. A potential solution – and an answer – to the outlined hypothesis of the research at hand could be reached via better communication between institutions and people. And a clear and open debate over all topics of interest, especially ones concerning everyday uncertainties within communities in the Member States.
The main method implemented in the text herein are content analysis in analyzing, researching and interpreting the presence of specific frames, themes, concepts, etc. of the emergence of a newer, more electorally successful far-right elite class across the EU. This will be achieved via looking through scientific articles, publications and media monitoring. To that end, the timeframe chosen is a more contemporary period of 2024–2026, although a few examples of earlier activity will be provided in order to better illustrate the point being made that this is a process of decades in the making.
Preparing for the wave
Strictly speaking, when approaching the topic of the rise of the far-right, especially in the European Union, there are certain aspects that require clarification. Describing said political phenomenon as heterogenic might be a concise enough way of putting it – the right and especially the far-right has a variety of understandings, positions and values that would prevent it from easily forming a homogeneous supranational movement. Some are populist, others are nationalist, racist and so on and so forth. A commonality between them is the idea of “combating democratic institutions, using inequality as a key value, condemning the “downfall” of society” [6] and in fact such ideas have to a point helped in a sort of unification on a pan European level.
There are some think tanks, for example, that assist in promoting far-right values and assisting in their internalization by societies. Contemporary examples include the Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC) Brussels – “a think tank funded by a private educational institute in Hungary with close ties to the government of Viktor Orbán, which arrived in the city in 2022 and regularly hosts events critical of the EU and liberal policies. It has been particularly active in the run-up to Sunday’s Hungarian election.” [7] Other examples could include New Direction – the Foundation for European Conservatism. Founded in 2009 under the patronage of M. Thatcher “as the intellectual hub of European Conservatism, New Direction has established academic networks across Europe and research partnerships throughout the world.” [8] Or, as they themselves promote it – “the intellectual home of Europe’s growing conservative movement, giving a voice to national movements that promote the rule of law, traditional values, free markets, and respect for the principle of protecting national sovereignty.” [9]
The modern role of think tanks is not in doubt here, but such means are an adaption of contemporary times. They are in fact demanded. Before employing such techniques to exert influence over public opinions via seminars, public events and speeches, work with academia and politicians and so on, there have also been means to help further political values and messages. In the case of the mentioned think tanks – as a tool for influence – they help concentrate effort.
In crediting the far-right, they have possessed the intellectual and strategic advantage of preparing the foundation of their operations ever since at least the 1970s. Employing a number of philosophers, sociologists, historians, authors and other such representatives of the intelligentsia [10] in the effort “to criticize the condition of “European affairs”, forwarding the question of a crisis of the European identity” [11] and so on. At that moment in time, the core around which the far-right congregated was the GRECE (Groupement de Recherche et d’Études pour la Civilisation Européenne/Research and Study Group for European Civilization) which in the end of the 1960s united 500 intellectuals. [12] What is more intriguing, they did also rely on their activity in the printed media via magazines such as Element, Le Figaro magazine and Ecole nouvelle (in Italian and French). [13]
All of this is not to present a historic overview of the organizational capabilities of the far-right during the past 50-60 years but to assist in illustrating the idea that there is now no categorically new political phenomenon that threatens the democratic order in the EU or its member states.
Their rise of the current far-right is not an accidental wave, but rather a constructed, carefully planned and carried out effort that has been going on for decades. Perhaps in a way due to their being marginalized so much it has been inevitable for them to garner interest in a political environment where people have more fears for economic stability and fears of foreigners in a globalizing world.
Evoking Descartes [14]
In order to understand the issue of this wave of rising far-right parties across EU member states, we need to apply some sort of methodology to act as a bearing or stable foothold in our further pursuit of unraveling the problem at hand. Perhaps applying an adopted version of the Cartesian logic [15] and methodology could suffice. As to that point, we begin with acknowledging the existence of a far-right political wave that is threatening to engulf the political status quo and perhaps dismantle the democratic order in many member states of the EU.
To be more exact, it is being communicated that there is such a political wave that poses said threat. What could potentially be more beneficial to the current is to disassociate from the emotional factor and biases. After that, what we are left with is the idea that there is a new contender for political dominance – or to be more exact, an emergence of political contenders that have managed to obtain new and better positions to challenge the established political elites. We also have a communicator that is informing at least some part of the EU public that this new phenomenon presents a political threat to said communicator in some way by informing us that we all face an ontological threat. As outlined in earlier parts of this article, this occurrence is indeed a clash between political elites for the purpose of obtaining or preserving political power. Hence, the understanding that both sides view their part of the struggle as existential does not strain credulity.
But one could go further in stripping away at the layers of this issue. Because, while it is true that while there are contemporary issues within the EU’s day-to-day modus operandi that the far-right can make a foothold in, the very clash between political elites for dominance is certainly nothing remarkable to behold in the current age. Building on this idea, the public issues where far-right politicians seem to find a niche and manage to garner success, are also in a sense common. Meaning that whatever time or society, one will inevitably manage to find a discontented segment within any society. So, we have managed to outline that it is neither the phenomenon nor the public discontent – because as it was pointed out above, it is not those things per se but the scope with which they unfold that is the current problem. The common factor that will be proposed for consideration here is political communication itself.
Political communication is in fact a “condition for the functioning of our expanded public sphere … enabling interaction between information, politics, and communication, it emerges as a fundamental concept for analyzing the functioning of mass democracy.” [16] This means that, on the one hand, political communication is the very prerequisite that allows for both the status quo elites and the emerging far-right elites to have a chance at political power within a democratic society. However, it also means that this is the prerequisite for both of these sides to influence and shape public perceptions of themselves and their causes. Political communication is “a site of confrontation between discourses concerning politics, the stakes of which are the control of the political interpretation of the situation.” [17] As pointed out, both sides use narratives and framing devices in order to better position their cause in the outlined clash between elites. Here the question of public problems is not dismissed because it pertains to the methods employed by the political elites in their confrontation – meaning that it is no longer a question of arbitrary discontent, but a manipulation tactic.
What is more important is the underlined understanding that the main field of political action and interaction between the two outlined elites is the realm of political communication. This is to be the proverbial Archimedean point [18] for the current paper. To clarify, when describing this as the linchpin for the entire issue, what is understood is that there is a mismanagement of some sort of political expectations, public resources, policies or any combination between them. Because in a more pedestrian sense political communication is a tool for reaching agreements between different interested groups – mainly the public, the politicians and the media [19] – when tackling problems of common interest.
In the case at hand, we have two interested groups – one elite in power and one elite that seems to want to reach a position of a higher power than it has. The issue is that the second group of elites is inevitably threatening the first group, because it stands to reason that they want to take away from their power. The positions of power are of a limited quantity after all. The only resource that both those groups can equally access is the public opinion and subsequently the public vote. This is why the main point of conflict here is deduced to be the issue of political communication.
The political standoff
Having presented ample evidence for the carefully planned formation of a sufficiently strong far-right group of elites, outlining their inevitable desire to clash with the elites of the status quo and reasoning that the main tool that will be employed in said clash will be political communication – what is left is to look at the ways this whole scenario has been and could play out.
Inevitably, when we discuss extreme political views, we will reach the question of what is permissible to tolerate within society and what is not. Meaning that as far as we live in democratic societies across Europe, we must uphold certain democratic values such as free speech, freedom of expression and so on. Opposite to that, there must be a balance, because too much freedoms or unchecked freedoms could erode at the very same democratic principles we are trying to uphold and protect.
In this regard, some of the methods that have been and are currently being employed in tackling the far-right – banning them, prohibiting their rallies, etc. [20], may be understood. Entertaining an idea that seeks to disrupt the status quo can easily be viewed as undesirable for any group of ruling elites. Herein lies the question – how to tackle this political issue? Because on both sides we have two political elites that are contending for political dominance and in the middle of them we have the public of voters that are essentially the electoral resource that is the target of their political messaging.
The main problem has to be the heavy-handed response across the board. Because there is truth to the fact that a democratic society [21] cannot exercise an indiscriminate amount of tolerance on any and all topics. But that doesn’t mean that when a far-right politician or party, or spokesperson draws attention to a sensitive societal problem of legitimate concern they should be automatically shut down. While it is true that people on the far-right are quick to indulge in offering quick and easy solutions while praying on the fears and uncertainty of peoples, it is also true that there are some topics that the political establishments across the EU obtusely turn a blind eye to. Meaning that if we have topics that are of public concern and if people feel like their concerns are not being properly addressed, we will inevitably encounter a situation like the one we are in at the moment of writing this text. Political extremists are quite adept at carving out niches in such matters. And people in societies are willing to accept any solution to situations that seem as if they put their livelihood in existential uncertainty. And it is especially dangerous when there is only one solution that is being presented to them.
Yet another issue of political communication – there are topics that press upon immediate concerns for the peoples across the EU member states and only far-right political parties address them. As outlined earlier in the current text, such parties are very politically adaptive and are highly sensitive to certain types of societal concerns and fears. An outright refusal to address controversial topics doesn’t do any establishment any favors and it is arguably detrimental, simply because it takes away both their political initiative and their opportunity to frame the situation objectively – if not even favorably to their cause. To put it in another way, refusing to address topics and pursuing legal and administrative actions in response to others who raise them is also detrimental to the democratic process. Meaning that when trying to combat the far-right, if we implement extremist actions and methods, we will be no better than the opponents we want to defeat. Morally, we would be on the same level.
Discussion Questions or Potential outcomes
As mentioned earlier, what both groups of elites want to do is entice the electorate. They want votes in order to obtain a higher political position. But only one of the groups is willing to talk openly and in an approachable way over issues that concern the economy, policies, immigration, the model of integration we have between member states in the EU altogether and so on. Their goal might well be using populism and extremist rhetoric, but they do make themselves known and understood.
Conclusion
What could be done to counter this is to undertake a more comprehensive attempt for including and informing the peoples of the EU member states over the mentioned “uncomfortable” topics. It is within not communicating clearly enough or when ignoring said issues, that ambiguity sets in amongst any society. And that is where the far-right has found its footing. In a sense, addressing these topics in a manner favorable to the established status quo elites could lead to a better cohesion within EU member states societies individually and to a greater one for the entire Union as a whole. That’s more or less the most optimistic way for events to unfold, with a deepening of the integration between EU member states.
Another point to address is that if open debate is encouraged, a large portion of their influence will be negated. Admittedly, this does sound somewhat idealistic, but having an informed opinion is something that at least could be considered a democratic value. [22] The point here being that while some of the fears of the publics within EU member states are not being openly addressed, far-right spokesmen will inevitably find ground as the only alternative available. People will turn to any hope they can find if they are desperate enough, even if its solutions are provided by fearmongering populists. It would be more productive to reach open and constructive solutions that will genuinely help communities, rather than compromise the entirety of the democratic process.
A lack of effort will most probably result in the deepening of the outlined trends. And as a popular adage goes “What you’re not changing, you’re choosing.” Preserving political behaviors as they are will only lead down a spiral of “surprising”, but not really, electoral successes for the far-right or whatever other extremist political wave comes in the future.
References and Notes
[1] Mumford, M. (2025). The Rise of Far-Right Parties in Europe: Causes, Trends, and Implications, The Atlas Institute for International Affairs. (01 Mar. 2025). https:// atlasinstitute.org/the-rise-of-far-right-parties-in-europe-causes-trends-and-implications/. Retrieved on 03.06.2026.
[2] Growing – so to speak – from the works of far-right philosophers; from ideas and values popularized by different papers and media; from the work of far-right think tanks. See Бирюков, С., А. Барсуков, «Крайне правые» партии в современной Европе. От утопической ортодоксии к альтернативной стратегии», Мировая экономика и международные отношения, No. 8, 2011, 91–100. https://www. imemo.ru/index.php?page_id=1248&file=htpps://www.imemo.ru/files/File/magazines/ meimo/08_2011/10-Biriukov.pdf. Retrieved on 03.06.2026.
[3] Бирюков, С., & Барсуков, A. (2011). «Крайне правые» партии в современной Европе. От утопической ортодоксии к альтернативной стратегии», 91, Мировая экономика и международные отношения, 8, 91. [Biryukov, S., & Barsukov, A. (2011). „Krayne pravыe“ partii v sovremennoy Evrope. Ot utopicheskoy ortodoksii k alyternativnoy strategii”, 91, Mirovaya эkonomika i mezhdunarodnыe otnoshenia, 8, 91–100.]
[4] Mengüç, D. (2024). Far-Right: The Crisis Itself or the Result’, Cornel University, Department of Sociology. (15 Jun. 2024). https://sociology.cornell.edu/news/far-right-crisis-itself-or-result. Retrieved on 03.06.2026.
[5] Most recently formed – in 2024, it has 86 MEPs from 14 delegations. https:// www.patriotsforeurope.eu/. Retrieved on 03.06.2026.
[6] Бирюков, С., & Барсуков, A. (2011). «Крайне правые» партии в современной Европе. От утопической ортодоксии к альтернативной стратегии», 91, Мировая экономика и международные отношения, 8, 91. [Biryukov, S., & Barsukov, A. (2011). „Krayne pravыe“ partii v sovremennoy Evrope. Ot utopicheskoy ortodoksii k alyternativnoy strategii“, 91, Mirovaya эkonomika i mezhdunarodnыe otnoshenia, 8, 91–100.]
[7] Бирюков, С., & Барсуков, A. (2011). «Крайне правые» партии в современной Европе. От утопической ортодоксии к альтернативной стратегии», с. 91, Мировая экономика и международные отношения, 8, 91–100. [Biryukov, S., & Barsukov, A. (2011). „Krayne pravыe“ partii v sovremennoy Evrope. Ot utopicheskoy ortodoksii k alyternativnoy strategii“, s. 91, Mirovaya эkonomika i mezhdunarodnыe otnoshenia, 8, 91–100.]
[8] Eccles, M. (2026). Euroskeptic think tanks on the rise as Brussels slashes funding for pro-EU groups’. Politico. (09 Apr. 2026). https://www.politico.eu/article/euroskeptic-think-tanks-on-rise-as-brussel-slashes-funding-pro-eu-groups/. Retrieved on 03.06.2026.
[9] New Direction. Brussel. https://onthinktanks.org/think-tank/new-direction/. Retrieved on 03.06.2026.
[10] Бирюков, С., & Барсуков, A. (2011). «Крайне правые» партии в современной Европе. От утопической ортодоксии к альтернативной стратегии», с. 92, Мировая экономика и международные отношения, 8, 91–100. [Biryukov, S., & Barsukov, A. (2011). „Krayne pravыe“ partii v sovremennoy Evrope. Ot utopicheskoy ortodoksii k alyternativnoy strategii“, s. 92, Mirovaya эkonomika i mezhdunarodnыe otnoshenia, 8, 91–100.]
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] René Descartes, considered the “father of modern philosophy” is perhaps most famous for writing his Discourse on the Method and Meditations of First philosophy, among his many other contributions to science.
[15] Inspired by is it would be a more accurate way of describing it.
16] Wolton, D. (1989). La communication politique: construction d’un modèle. Political communication: building a model, reprint from issue no. 4 Hermès, the New Public Space, Reprise du no 4 de la revue Hermès, Le nouvel espace public, 1989, 13–21.
[17] Wolton, D. (1989). La communication politique : construction d’un modèle. Political communication: building a model, reprint from issue no. 4 Hermès, the New Public Space, Reprise du no 4 de la revue Hermès, Le nouvel espace public, 1989, 13–21.
[18] Metaphor for what is to be considered a solid foundation from where action can be taken.
[19] What is Political Communication, Exactly? American University. https://www. american.edu/spa/dispatches/what-is-political-communication-exactly.cfm. Retrieved on 03.06.2026.
[20] Example: Griera, M, (2026). Brussels watchdog moves to ban Alternative for Germany’s EU party’, Politico, (27 May 2026). https://www.politico.eu/article/ eu-watchdog-moves-ban-afd-far-right-party-over-breach-eu-values/. Retrieved on 03.06.2026.
[21] Or any society for that matter.
[22] It in-fact is, but while certain topics are considered taboo, perhaps its value has been diminished.
Bibliography
Бирюков, С., & Барсуков, A. (2011). «Крайне правые» партии в современной Европе. От утопической ортодоксии к альтернативной стратегии», Мировая экономика и международные отношения, 8, 91–100. [Biryukov, S., & Barsukov, A. (2011). „Krayne pravыe“ partii v sovremennoy Evrope. Ot utopicheskoy ortodoksii k alyternativnoy strategii“, Mirovaya эkonomika i mezhdunarodnыe otnoshenia, 8, 91–100.]
Eccles, M. (2026). Euroskeptic think tanks on the rise as Brussels slashes funding for pro-EU groups’. Politico. (09 Apr. 2026). https://www.politico.eu/article/ euroskeptic-think-tanks-on-rise-as-brussel-slashes-funding-pro-eu-groups/. Retrieved on 03.06.2026.
Griera, M, (2026). Brussels watchdog moves to ban Alternative for Germany’s EU party’, Politico, (27 May 2026). https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-watchdog-moves-ban-afd-far-right-party-over-breach-eu-values/. Retrieved on 03.06.2026.
Mumford, M. (2025). The Rise of Far-Right Parties in Europe: Causes, Trends, and Implications, The Atlas Institute for International Affairs. (01 Mar. 2025). https://atlasinstitute.org/the-rise-of-far-right-parties-in-europe-causes-trends-and-implications/. Retrieved on 03.06.2026.
Wolton, D. (1989). La communication politique : construction d’un modèle. Political communication: building a model, reprint from issue no. 4 Hermès, the New Public Space, Reprise du no 4 de la revue Hermès, Le nouvel espace public, 1989, 13–21.
Theodoros Vaniotis is a PhD candidate in New Bulgarian University. Topic of dissertation “Strategic dominance through new communication technologies: the case between the USA and Russia”, focusing on the period 2016 – 2022. He is a part-time lecturer in Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski” on the course ‘Bulgarian-Russian relations’ and part-time assistant lecturer on the course ‘Political communications and marketing’.
Manuscript was submitted: 01.06.2026.
Double Blind Peer Reviews: from 02.06.2026 till 03.07.2026.
Accepted: 05.07.2026.
Брой 68 на сп. „Реторика и комуникации“ (юли 2026 г.) се издава с финансовата помощ на Фонд научни изследвания, договор № КП-06-НП7/23 от 08 декември 2025 г.
Issue 68 of the Rhetoric and Communications Journal (July 2026) is published with the financial support of the Scientific Research Fund, Contract No. KP-06-NP7/23 of December 08, 2025.