Реторика и комуникация в обществото

Rhetoric and Communication in Society

 DOI 10.55206/WRQR5279

Shane Crombie

LCC International University, Klaipėda, Lithuania

E-mail: scrombie@lcc.lt

 

Abstract: This paper investigates the rhetorical potential of small nations to project influence and challenge the power of major global actors, specifically examining the puny-versus-prodigious narrative in international relations. It challenges conventional, power-centric views that predominantly emphasize the inherent vulnerabilities of small states. Focusing on the recent and ongoing diplomatic confrontation between China and Lithuania, triggered by Vilnius’s bold and assertive diplomatic stance, the study analyzes how a geographically small nation can generate influence disproportionate to its size. Using Fantasy Theme Analysis, the research critically examines the underlying rhetorical implications for Lithuania, focusing on the public statements and diplomatic discourse articulated by the former Foreign Minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis. The analysis uncovers several key fantasy themes that resonate within this narrative. These themes include the critical role of visibility in gaining international support, the moral imperative of standing ground, the necessity of national assertiveness of small nations in maintaining sovereignty, and the emerging concept of leadership of small nations in championing value-based foreign policy. The paper reveals how Lithuania, despite a clear and significant power asymmetry, strategically leveraged its distinct historical experience – particularly its memory of Soviet occupation and struggle for independence – to frame its position. This approach not only generated strong domestic identification and support but also effectively garnered international attention. Ultimately, the study showcases that even so-called ‘minnows’ can effectively challenge and reshape the global order by employing strategic communication and principled defiance rooted in democratic values, redefining their role from passive recipients of global politics to active, influential agents.

Keywords: rhetoric, fantasy themes, small states, diplomacy, geopolitics.

Introduction

Traditional and classical perspectives of small states often underscore their inherent vulnerabilities and limitations, their reduced military, economic, and diplomatic capabilities inevitably rendering them susceptible to external pres­sures. Thucydides articulated this power imbalance in his Melian Dialogue, “the strong do what they want and the weak suffer what they must”. [1] This grim sentiment continues to resonate in contemporary analyses. Such views often lead to the perception that small states are inherently weak, lacking genuine independence, and frequently acting as “free riders and suboptimal participants in the international system.” [2] They are often depicted as lacking the necessary credentials, visibility, strong voice, and sufficient diplomatic resources to engage effectively and autonomously within the global arena. Consequently, small states are frequently characterized as “the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship, unable to change the nature or functioning of the relationship on their own”. [3] This perspective often casts them either as “victims of great-power aggression or free riders on great powers’ good will,” thereby facing a dual set of challenges that encompass both domestic capacity constraints and external pressures. [4]

The Mouse that Roars

Despite the prevailing, albeit often simplified, view of small states as inherently vulnerable or insignificant, alternative scholarly perspectives have emerged to challenge this deterministic narrative. These revised viewpoints suggest that small states are not merely passive recipients of great power dictates but active agents capable of exercising significant influence, often disproportionate to their physical size. The 1959 satirical film The Mouse That Roars, which depicts a tiny European duchy declaring war on the United States and unexpectedly winning, serves as a powerful cultural reference point for this phenomenon: a small entity achieving unexpected influence and demonstrating agency against overwhelming odds. It is worth noting, numerically there are significantly more small nations on the map than their larger counterparts. This perspective provocatively implies that “it is not small nations that are punching above their weight, but the disproportionate number of small states that should draw attention,” thereby prompting a fundamental re-evaluation of what constitutes success, victory, and effective statecraft for nations with limited conventional power. [5] The wins small nations look for are not just found on the battlefield; there are often other prizes on offer; international recognition, domestic concerns, and the primary desire to keep existing, despite extenuating circumstances. Now and again David still takes on Goliath.

Small Nations Today – Lithuania v China

A current example of a Davidic struggle is ongoing tension between two unlikely protagonists – the Republic of Lithuania and the People’s Republic of China. Lithuania’s assertive defiance of China since 2021 provides a compelling modern example of a mouse that roars. This stance, against a nation with an economy roughly 200 times larger and a population approximately 500 times greater, originates from a deeply ingrained and consciously articulated “values-based foreign policy”. [6] This commitment is a foundational tenet of the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats party, which was the main government party in power when relations with China declined. Gabrielius Landsbergis, who served as Lithuania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from December 2020 until November 2024 in the Šimonytė Cabinet, played a major role in shaping this policy. The party’s pre-election manifesto explicitly promised to “maintain the value backbone” in foreign policy, particularly “with countries such as China,” signaling an unwavering adherence to democratic principles even when confronting powerful authoritarian states. [7]

This values-driven approach is deeply rooted in Lithuania’s history. The nation’s strong anti-authoritarian stance is a direct and profound legacy of fifty years of Soviet domination. Having been the first Soviet republic to declare independence in March 1990 – a historic movement spearheaded by Gabrielius Landsbergis’s own grandfather, Vytautas Landsbergis – Lithuania bears the scars and lessons of totalitarian rule. China is keenly aware of the symbolism of such historical narratives. Lithuania’s foreign policy under Landsbergis’ oversight is an application of deeply learned historical lessons.

Theoretical Framework: Fantasy Theme Analysis

Fantasy Theme Analysis is a rhetorical critical method rooted in Ernest Bormann’s symbolic convergence theory. This analytical approach examines shared understanding in groups of worldview, collective consciousness, and communal meanings that emerge within groups by scrutinizing how these meanings are disseminated, reinforced, and internalized through various forms of human communication. These communicative forms include, but are not limited to, stories, jokes, analogies, vivid dramatizations, and recurring narratives. [8] According to Bormann, a common reality and a collective consciousness – a sense of shared identity and purpose – are not merely pre-existing conditions within groups but are actively constructed and solidified through the dynamic process of sharing symbolic messages, particularly narratives or what Bormann termed fantasies. A fantasy, is not just a simple imaginary construct, defining it as “a creative and imaginative interpretation of events that fulfills a psychological or rhetorical need” within a group. [9] These interpretations, often present vivid dramatizations of past, present, or future events, allow members of a community to make sense of their shared experiences, assign meaning to ambiguous situations, and collectively respond to challenges. When these individual interpretations or dramatizations are shared, discussed, elaborated upon, and embraced as a reality by a group, fantasies can chain out – a process by which they spread, gaining momentum and adherence, eventually leading to the widespread establishment of a shared reality or a pervasive rhetorical vision. This chaining process transforms individual insights into collective truths, forging a powerful sense of unity and shared purpose within the rhetorical community.

The basic unit of analysis within FTA is the fantasy theme. This is defined as a word, phrase, statement, or a complete dramatistic rhetorical statement that offers an interpretation of completed, enduring and anticipated events. [10] These themes typically encompass three fundamental components that collectively form a complete dramatic narrative: settings delineate the contexts, environments, or physical/temporal locations where the events unfold, characters, individuals, groups, or even abstract entities involved in the narrative, often portrayed with specific moral, intellectual, or emotional qualities, and actions found in a plot, or sequence of events detail the characters’ motivations, behaviors, interactions, and the ultimate resolution or unfolding of the narrative. Beyond individual fantasy themes, fantasy types represent more abstract, overarching patterns or archetypes that recur across multiple, distinct rhetorical visions. These types provide a deeper understanding of the underlying symbolic commonalities. Ultimately, a rhetorical vision emerges as a coherent, encompassing, and often compelling interpretation of reality. This vision materializes from the extensive and intricate integration of various fantasy themes and types, forming the shared worldview, collective values, fundamental beliefs, and guiding motivations of a rhetorical community. [11]

Applying Fantasy Theme Analysis to the Lithuania-China confrontation offers a lens through which to understand the underlying shared narratives that shape perceptions, rationalize actions, and legitimize political stances on both sides. This methodological approach helps ask why Lithuania, despite its relatively small stature, adopts its specific, assertive stance, and how China endeavors to counter that narrative and reassert its dominance?

 

Analysis 

Setting – Lithuania’s History

The geopolitical confrontation examined in this paper is set within the Republic of Lithuania, a relatively small Baltic nation situated on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, with a contemporary population of less than 3 million people. This historical narrative provides the setting, shaping its national psyche and influencing its contemporary foreign policy choices. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, established in the 13th century, was once a powerful and expansive state, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Its influence began to wane with the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569. The Commonwealth lasted until 1795 when it was partitioned by imperial Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The territory of modern Lithuania subsequently fell under prolonged Russian dominance. Throughout the 19th century, attempts at national self-determination were brutally met with harsh restrictions imposed by the Tsarist regime, which systematically sought to undermine various facets of Lithuanian cultural life, including its distinct religious practices and, significantly, its national language. [12]

Similar to other Central and Eastern European countries, such as Czechia and Poland, a revival cultural and linguistic renaissance flourished in Lithuania during the mid-19th century, keeping alive the aspiration of an independent ethno-state persisted. As the First World War ended, the independent Republic of Lithuania, alongside its Baltic neighbors Latvia and Estonia, was established. [13] Statehood was not to last. Lithuania was occupied by the Soviets in 1940, then by Nazi Germany in 1941, and finally again by the Soviets in 1944, afterwards becoming subsumed into the USSR as the Lietuvos Tarybų Socialistinė Respublika (LTSR). Active resistance by various partisan groups, continued in a guerrilla war until the mid-1950s, a testament to the enduring desire for national identity.

Soviet dominance eventually was challenged with the landmark declaration of Re-Establishment of the State of Lithuania in March 1990. This period of reassertion was altogether smooth. On January 13^th, 1991, Soviet authorities attempted to crush the nascent independence movement, resulting in 13 deaths at the Vilnius Television Tower. Other serious altercations such as the summary execution of Lithuanian border guards at Medininkai in July snowballed rather than deterred Lithuanian resolve. [14]

Since 1991, Lithuania integrated into the European political scene, joining both the European Union and NATO. It has been consistently vocal in its condemnation of the Russian Federation, especially following the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This has not gone unnoticed by the Kremlin. In 2025, an e-book on the history of Lithuania, forwarded by Sergi Lavrov, was published under the auspices of the Russian government. The text calls into question Lithuania’s legitimacy as a nation, much in the same way as Vladimir Putin did about Ukraine in an essay attributed to him published in the run up to the major escalation of the Russo-Ukraine war. [15] This deeply embedded historical setting, marked by struggles, provides an indispensable context for understanding Lithuania’s seemingly audacious decision to pick a fight with China. Having experienced decades of external subjugation, it is therefore entirely reasonable that Lithuania would express solidarity with another small entity like Taiwan.

Characters – Gabrielius Landsbergis – ex foreign minister

A central character in the Lithuania-China narrative is Gabrielius Landsbergis, who served as Lithuania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from December 2020 until the general election of 2024. Born in Vilnius on January 7, 1982, Landsbergis’s early career saw him engaged in diplomatic service, working within the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later in the President’s Chancellery, honing his understanding of international relations and statecraft before entering elective office. His political career subsequently progressed through significant roles: he served as a Member of the European Parliament from 2014 to 2016 and as a Member of the Seimas [Lithuanian Parliament] from 2016 to 2024, in his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Following the 2024 parliamentary election, he resigned as party chairman and declined a position in the new government.

His own name has a certain political weight. His grandfather, Vytautas Landsbergis was an intellectual and the leader of the Sąjūdis movement and was the first head of state of independent Lithuania from 1990 to 1992.  this paper is not arguing that he has some kind of personification of Lithuania. It can be noted that as a reasonably attractive, well spoken, young leader, with a good name, it becomes easier to project a Boermanesque fantasy onto him. His mandate was given to him by the electorate, and was not due to his family connection, so there is no suggestion of royal or noble-like qualities. In saying that Landsbergis’ character, is not merely that of a diplomat but a prominent figure who strategically leverages Lithuania’s historical experience to assert the agency of a small nation on the global stage. During his tenure as foreign minister, Landsbergis was not afraid to play a role on this stage. His decisions and public statements regarding China brought the mouse of Lithuania into direct diplomatic confrontation with a formidable lion.

Action – The Lithuania – China Spat

The diplomatic friction between Lithuania and China, while simmering for some time, significantly escalated with two actions undertaken by Lithuania in 2021. The first was Lithuania’s withdrawal from China’s 17+1 European Engagement Policy. The 17+1 initiative, established in 2012, was ostensibly designed for developing mutual investment and trade between China and Central and Eastern European countries. However, it was increasingly viewed by critics, including Lithuania, as a strategic vehicle for China’s large-scale infrastructure projects within its global ‘Belt and Road’ initiative, ultimately aimed at fostering division within the EU and gaining political leverage over individual member states. [16] Landsbergis urged other European Union countries to follow suit, advocating for a more unified “27+1” approach within the broader EU framework. [17] Lithuania’s withdrawal and call for collective EU action thus represented a direct challenge to China’s diplomatic strategy in Europe. The second occurred in July 2021 when Lithuania announced its acceptance of Taiwan’s request to open a Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius. This decision was particularly objectionable to Beijing because it explicitly used the term “Taiwan” rather than the more commonly accepted “Taipei.” The city name is preferred by China to avoid any implication of Taiwan’s independent statehood. The naming choice was interpreted by Beijing, as an, albeit subtle, nod to the recognition of Taiwan’s separate status. Lithuania’s nihil obstat for this move challenged the linguistic control that China often wields over Taiwan’s international representation.

Beijing’s response to these Lithuanian actions noticeably severe. China recalled its ambassador from Vilnius and subsequently demanded that the Lithuanian ambassador leave Beijing. This signaled a profound rupture in bilateral relations. China imposed a series of escalating economic restrictions. These included halting the passage of Chinese cargo train into the country and implementing unofficial import bans, making it nearly impossible for Lithuanian exporters to sell their goods in China. Lithuania was simply taken off the list Chinese trading partners – it did not exist. As Landsbergis observed, it was not the first time a communist country ‘canceled’ Lithuania. [18] Chinese state media were highly critical. In 2023, even after things had settled down it Chinese state media mocked Lithuania as small “pawn” of Washington, not its own agent. [19] The message from Beijing was very clear; any country challenging China’s core interests would face severe consequences.

Lithuania has proven surprisingly resilient, confounding Beijing’s expectations. While acknowledging the apparent imbalance “a tiny Baltic nation with fewer than 3 million people against a rising superpower with 1.4 billion” – Lithuania has demonstrated that “even tiny countries can create headaches for a superpower”. [20] An important factor in Lithuania’s resilience is its limited economic ties with China. As Ferenczy highlighted, “precisely its small dimensions allowed Lithuania to take the diplomatic hit without any serious consequences.” [21] Unlike larger EU economies deeply intertwined with the Chinese market, Lithuania does not have strong economic ties with the PRC, with Chinese investments in Lithuania reportedly worth only €3 million and Lithuanian companies investing a mere €40 million in Beijing’s economy. This economic insulation made it abundantly clear that so far Lithuania has nothing to lose in a diplomatic confrontation undermining Beijing’s primary tool of coercion.

Landsbergis observed that Lithuania’s “small size” “made us an easy target” because China calculated “it is good to pick enemies way, way, way below your size, draw them into the fighting ring and then beat them to pulp”. [22] This very vulnerability has become a source of strength. By proving its immunity to economic blackmail, Lithuania has demonstrated that even a “minnow” can effectively defy a rising superpower. [23] thereby setting a precedent and exposing the limits of the effectiveness of larger nations’ coercive diplomacy. Lithuania’s strategic geopolitical position, particularly as a “transit corridor for trains carrying goods from China to Europe,” gives it an outsized, albeit often overlooked, role in Beijing’s strategic calculations, amplifying the impact of its defiance. [24]

Lithuania has deeply internalized the lessons from their traumatic 20th-century history. The prevailing lesson is that “respect is the main political currency in dealing with authoritarian regimes. If you want to be respected – stand your ground and be prepared for sacrifices”. [25] By demonstrating such firmness and a readiness to forsake immediate material gain in the face of Chinese intimidation, “Lithuania sets a rare European example of firmness and readiness to forsake material gain in the face of the Chinese regime’s growing global intimidation tactics. By doing so, it punches well above its political weight and secures attention in Washington” [26], demonstrating that principled foreign policy can indeed yield strategic dividends for a small state.

 

Fantasy Themes

So, what does Landsbergis have to say? What are the fantasies he uses and how do these communicate to his audience – international and domestic, adversaries and allies? To answer these questions, a series of interviews – both printed and recorded have been analyzed. There are two distinct periods in his political career that are relevant to this discussion: his tenure as foreign minister and the current time, after the end of his term. Since most interviews that cover numerous topics only interviews that discussed China as a topic were included in the sample (that is, not just in passing). The analysis reveals a consistent and strategically deployed set of fantasy themes. Five major ones can be selected: visibility, countering the bully, memory, assertiveness, and leadership. These themes collectively shape Lithuania’s robust rhetorical vision regarding its confrontation with China, contributing to a powerful and cohesive narrative that effectively serves both domestic and international audiences. Landsbergis’s articulation of these themes not only explains Lithuania’s actions but also positions him as a principled actor on the international stage.

Visibility Theme

As small nations cannot make their presence by the exertion of military or economic might, publicity and notice must be achieved by other means. The theme of visibility and recognition is a noticeable factor in Landsbergis’ narrative of events. China’s aggressive and coercive actions intended to punish Lithuania and deter other nations for going against it, inadvertently backfired by elevating Lithuania’s international profile and giving wind to this particular mouse’s roar. Landsbergis repeatedly articulates this paradoxical outcome, emphasizing how China’s coercion transformed Lithuania’s alternative type of engagement with Taiwan into a global phenomenon, giving the Baltic nation unexpected, and rather than shame it into silence, boosted its visibility. In one interview, he observed: “Lithuania, you know, a tiny country from Northern Europe… suddenly we become a name – okay, more political than economic, obviously, but still a name that is recognized. And that recognition, for a small state like ours, is invaluable”. [27]

He elaborated on this transformational journey: “The journey that we took, in four years, it really was transformational for [you know] for a small country like mine. We were always talking about ‘punching above our weight’ but Beijing inadvertently gave us the platform to actually do it. [28] This theme underscores a clear rhetorical strategy, which was probably not planned, portraying China’s actions not as a defeat but as a catalyst for unforeseen positive international recognition and a reinforcement of Lithuania’s foreign policy autonomy. Landsbergis further highlighted the strategic benefit of this new visibility, noting that before the spat: “many around the world might have struggled to locate Lithuania on a map. Now, thanks to Beijing’s overreach, our name is synonymous with principled defiance. This isn’t just about trade; it’s about reputation and influence, which for a small nation, is a powerful form of capital.” [29] He suggested that China’s attempt to isolate Lithuania instead forced it into the spotlight, inadvertently creating new avenues for diplomatic engagement and proving the resilience of its values-based approach. The narrative is framed, as he suggested, to demonstrate that adversarial misjudgment facilitated, what Landsbergis spins as favorable from Lithuania’s perspective.

Confronting the Bully Theme

In the context of bully versus victim/David and Goliath trope, Landsbergis is happy to play the inferior role, as in his estimation, in this case the victim wins. This theme portrays China as an aggressor whose coercive tactics were unjust and punitive, but that ultimately backfired Lithuania’s resilience and corresponding unified Western response. This strategic miscalculation, Landsbergis argues, led to China’s own diplomatic and economic setbacks in this specific instance. Landsbergis notes China’s fundamental misjudgment: “they didn’t expect [the] united Western reaction in response to their to their coercion because they’ve been very active trying to convince everybody that, ‘Look, you know, this thing is just too small, you shouldn’t worry about them too much.’ They thought they could isolate us, but instead, they galvanized others”. [30]

While it took the united front to counter the might of China’s power it is almost as if Lithuania was being picked on the schoolyard by a bigger student, only for all of Lithuania’s brothers and sisters to rally around. The rallying point was Lithuania. They beat the bully without raising a fist “trade is almost back to pre-levels with the global redirection of supply chains, while diplomatically, both countries are ‘still in the in the freezer,’ leading to his confident conclusion, I think that we won this round! It was a test, and they failed it.” [31]

Landsbergis draws a parallel with Australia, another country that faced Chinese economic coercion. He suggests that the outcome was different for Lithuania because they were not the first ones to confront what he describes as a test: “[Australia was] tested for the first time, [to see] how much pressure a country can withstand but they did not get a response, a global response. They should have, allowing China to mistakenly believe this model of economic punishment could be effectively pursued against others. Then, “here comes Lithuania!”. [32]

This theme positions Lithuania not as a victim, but as a resilient and strategically astute actor capable of exposing and effectively countering a bully’s flawed and ultimately self-defeating strategy. It directly reinforces the archetypal David vs. Goliath narrative, framing Lithuania as small state who did not have to stand alone in its own test. Relying on the support of others the challenger had no option to quietly back down. Landsbergis’s rhetoric transformed a perceived weakness into a testament of unity, inviting international willingness to take their part and give solidarity.

Memory Theme 

An underlying theme of memory in observable. Faced with a potential harmful threat, it is only natural for a smaller body to act in a self-preservative way. Landsbergis is not only dependent on the actions of external allies, as a democratically elected official he is also needs to address the needs of the domestic audience, particularly if this audience needs bear the brunt of whatever pain is going to be experienced. There is an undertone of remembrance. The home front is called to remember their own history. This theme is deeply embedded in Landsbergis’s rhetoric, both implicitly and at times, explicitly. The historical themes discussed in the setting section are not merely historical facts but constantly present, living memories in the Lithuanian rhetorical vision. Now it is time for Lithuania to remember that in the past it was necessary to price for freedom and the right to stand on equal footing with other nations. This historical trauma, coupled with the profound lessons learned from decades of occupation – namely, that “respect is the main political currency in dealing with authoritarian regimes” and that “if you want to be respected – stand your ground and be prepared for sacrifices” [33] Landsbergis draws on the deep wellspring of national memory. He reminds Lithuanians of the unwavering spirit of the early post-soviet resistance, asking: “If our ancestors could stand against an empire for decades in the forests, can we not stand firm against economic pressure today for our values?” [34] It is similar in tone to the words of the President of Lithuanian G. Nausėda “Our strength has always been our unity and our unwavering commitment to freedom. This is not just a foreign policy; it is who we are, etched into our very being by generations of struggle.” [35]

Such appeals tap into national pride and the collective memory of hard-won sovereignty, transforming foreign policy decisions into a continuation of the national liberation narrative. This historical framing underpins narratives of a principled stand or of moral courage, which emphasizes Lithuania’s actions as deeply rooted in its unique historical experience that in times of peace are easily forgotten. A reminder attempts to ensure that the domestic audience will see the government’s actions as a morally imperative: “We know what it means to live under the shadow of a great power dictating our destiny and we swore ‘Never again.’ That oath guides our foreign policy today, for ourselves and for those who still struggle for freedom”. [36] The invocation of history transforms contemporary foreign policy into a patriotic duty, fostering strong domestic identification and support.

Assertiveness Theme

Memory, however, is not just passive, in the case of Lithuanian memory is a source of national vitality. Thematically, assertiveness highlights Lithuania’s sense of independence and an assertion of its right to pursue its own diplomatic path, including the freedom to choose its own partners and conduct its foreign policy autonomously. Like many other nations who have a shared history, Lithuania pushes back against the label of being a ‘post-soviet’ nation. In the 1990s and 2000s, this moniker defined emerging democracies in eastern and northern Europe that fell to the east of the Iron Curtain. The while important in the national psyche, it does not define the contemporary Lithuania experience – it is a nation in its own right. Consequently, any perceived or otherwise, attempt to dictate its diplomatic restrictions are resisted. Landsbergis articulates this principle: “First of all, the country can choose who it, you know, who it prefers to work with, who it prefers to be partners with. This is a fundamental tenet of sovereignty, not a concession”. [37]

Landsbergis further stressed the existential necessity of pushing back against any form of curtailment to sovereignty. He argued that yielding to such pressure would inevitably diminish a nation’s autonomy: “The lesson from it is that if we are unable to push back, we will be bullied by this every single time, and it reduces our operational space, sovereign operational space. [If] we are not allowed to, you know, to do something because we just kind of we don’t know what the Chinese reaction [will be], and [because of this reaction] we’d better not to try.” [38] Hesitation or self-censorship in foreign policy due to fear of economic reprisal amounts to a surrender of hard-won independence. This rhetorical framing underscores that Lithuania’s actions are about a foundational principle of international relations: the unassailable right of every sovereign state, regardless of size, to determine its own foreign policy.

Leadership Theme

The final theme is the summation of all others. As a small nation, Lithuania has the right to be leader in its own right. Its ‘right’ to lead is fundamentally rooted in its history, its commitment to democracy and solidarity the recognition of other nations gives. While being cautioned that such polices could backfire, Landsbergis himself consistently, and often explicitly, champions a ‘values-based foreign policy’. He achieves this by emphasizing the paramount importance of standing on one’s own two feet, even if there are challenges. His arguments imply a willingness to be brave and to act decisively and proactively in the face of geopolitical challenges. He does not sugar coat the threats. If something seriously goes wrong on the international stage no one will be untouched: “We will be paying a price, and it’s better than to decide now, how you want that price to be paid.” [39] It also intrinsically connects this the inherent potential for smaller nations to unite against shared threats, forming a collective leadership against authoritarian expansion: “Our commitment to democratic values is not a luxury; it is the bedrock of our national security and the glue that binds us to our true allies.” [40] This consistent rhetorical thread solidifies Lithuania’s image as an leader on the world stage whose foreign policy is a direct reflection of its deeply held national values and historical experiences, offering a directional guide for others facing similar dilemmas.

Conclusion

Lithuania’s diplomatic engagement with China since 2021 serves as an exceptionally compelling and timely case study in the rhetorical agency of small nations, demonstrating their profound capacity to “roar” with surprising force despite significant power disparities. Lithuania’s actions are framed not as reckless provocations but as principled and necessary defenses of democratic values and the foundational international rules-based order, and national sovereignty undertaken despite the clear risk of economic and diplomatic retaliation. This overarching vision aims not only to galvanize internal unity and inspire solidarity among like-minded nations but also to leverage Lithuania’s inherent “smallness” not as an inherent weakness but as a strategic asset – a powerful symbol of commitment to freedom and self-determination.

Exemplified by the words and actions of Gabrielis Landsbergis, Lithuania’s projection of a self-image as a symbol of defiance and moral courage, asserting that small nations too have a voice and a right to self-determination. Lithuania’s narrative, rooted in the universal archetype of the underdog triumphing through moral courage, resonates deeply and powerfully with nations that share similar historical experiences of struggling against larger powers, or those that harbor anxieties about China’s increasingly assertive and coercive foreign policy. It critically challenges traditional small state theory by presenting Lithuania not as a passive, “dysfunctional,” or “free rider” state, but as an active and principled moral agent capable of shaping international discourse. The observable “chaining out” of Lithuania’s narrative – evidenced by robust EU discussions regarding collective responses to Chinese coercion, Australia’s vocal support, and growing international attention – strongly suggests that its rhetorical vision has indeed gained significant traction among a global community increasingly concerned about the erosion of democratic values and the rise of authoritarian influence Ultimately, Lithuania’s assertive rhetoric serves a dual purpose: it not only effectively rallies domestic support and reinforces national identity by invoking historical narratives of resistance, but it also projects a potent image of principled defiance on the international stage. In doing so, Lithuania demonstrably proves that even the smallest nations can indeed roar, communicating a message of the enduring importance of values, sovereignty, and rhetorical prowess in shaping the dynamics of global power.

 

References and Notes

[1] Thucydides. (1972). History of the Peloponnesian War [R. Warner, Trans.]. Penguin Books. [Original work published c. 431 BCE].

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[3] Veenendaal, W. (2016). Political parties in microstates. Routledge, 6.

[4] Hey, J. A. K. (2003). Small states in world politics: An introduction. In J. A. K. Hey (Ed.), Small states in world politics (pp. 1–13). Lynne Rienner Publishers, 6.

[5] Wivel & Wiberg, (2013). The international relations of small states: From vulnerability to agency. Palgrave Macmillan, 19.

[6] Kishinevsky, D. (2021, November 29). Why little Lithuania is taking on mighty China. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/ posts/2021/11/why-little-lithuania-is-taking-on-mighty-china?lang=en. Retrieved on 10.10.2025.

[7] Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats. (2020). Programme of the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats, 14.

[8] Bormann, E. G. (1972). Fantasy and rhetorical vision: The rhetorical criticism of social reality. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 58(4), 396–407.

[9] Bormann, E. G. (1985). Symbolic convergence theory: A communication formulation. Journal of Communication, 35(4), 128–138.

[10] Bormann, E. G. (1985). Symbolic convergence theory: A communication formulation. Journal of Communication, 35(4), 129.

[11] Bormann, E. G. (1985). Symbolic convergence theory: A communication formulation. Journal of Communication, 35(4), 128–138.

[12] Snyder, T. (2004). The reconstruction of nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999. Yale University Press.

[13] Hiden, J., & Salmon, P. (1994). The Baltic nations and Europe: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the twentieth century. Longman.

[14] Laurinavicius, C., & Statkevicius, V. (2017). The January events of 1991: Documents and materials. Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania.

[15] Meduza, 2025 Meduza. (2025, May 2). Russian foreign minister pens foreword to book challenging Lithuanian statehood. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/05/02/ russian-foreign-minister-pens-foreword-to-book-challenging-lithuanian-statehood. Retrieved on 22.11.2025.

[16] Brattberg, E., & Soula, E. (2018, October 19). Europe’s Emerging Approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/10/europes-emerging-approach-to-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative?lang=en. Retrieved on 22.11.2025.

[17] Landsbergis, G. (2021). G. Landsbergis: Jei santykiuose su Kinija veiksime ne ES 27 formatu – pralaimėsime daugelyje frontų. Užsienio reikalų ministerija. https:// www.urm.lt/naujienos/141/g.-landsbergis-jei-santykiuose-su-kinija-veiksime-ne-es-27-formatu-pralaimesime-daugelyje-frontu:24741. Retrieved on 22.11.2025.

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[38] Chatham House. (2024, December 12). Safeguarding Europe: Keynote speech: Gabrielius Landsbergis Keynote [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=2V5dcycJO7g

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Shane Crombie is Associate Professor of Communication, at LCC International University, Klaipėda, Lithuania. He holds a doctorate (D.Min) in homiletics and preaching and is currently perusing a PhD in Rhetoric at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”.

Ръкописът е изпратен на 06.11.2025 г.

Рецензиране от двама независими рецензенти: от 12.11.2025 до 12.12.2025 г.

Приемане за публикуване: 14.12.2025 г.

Manuscript was submitted: 06.11.2025.

Double Blind Peer Reviews: from 12.11.2025 till 12.12.2025.

Accepted: 14.12.2025.

Брой 66 на сп. „Реторика и комуникации“ (януари 2026 г.) се издава с финансова­та помощ на Фонд научни изследвания, договор № КП-06-НП7/23 от 08 декември 2025 г.

Issue 66 of the Rhetoric and Communications Journal (January 2026) is published with the financial support of the Scientific Research Fund, Contract No. KP-06-NP7/23 of December 08, 2025.