Olga Brusylovska

Одески държавен университет „И. И. Мечников”, Украйна

Имейл: brusilovskao@mail.ru

Abstract: Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse that views language as a form of social practice and focuses on the ways social and political domination are reproduced in texts and speech. In comparison with other methods СDA has no clearly regulated procedure of selection of materials and the analysis itself. Therefore СDA has been criticized for subjectivity in the interpretation of the data. However CDA has a number of advantages: 1) it can eliminate the contradiction between qualitative and quantitative orientation of scientific methods; 2) it does not require complicated procedures for the data collection; 3) it is very economical; 4) any other analytical tool allows you to check its results; 5) it involves large amounts of textual material which allows direct analysis of data, eliminating from allegations of secondary data analysis and interpretation. The discipline of International Relations using CDA gives an opportunity to convert the study from meta-level to the level of discursive practices. It also gives a possibility to overcome the artificial division of spheres of internal and foreign policy. Several studies using CDA appeared in Russia and Ukraine in the recent years.

Keywords: critical discourse analysis (CDA), methods, advantages, opportunities, study, international relations.

Critical Discourse Analysis: Methods, Advantages, and Opportunities for the Study of International Relations

The aim of this article is to explore how Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) helps Political Scientists to convert the study from meta-level to the level of discursive practices, especially in the sphere of International Relations.

The main research questions:

• Does CDA have more advantages or flows?

• How is CDA capable of enriching the research tool kit of professional historians, sociologists and political scientists?

• How is Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s theory of discourse, ideology, universality, and hegemony developing CDA?

• What do the best samples of papers using discourse analysis methods exist in Russia and Ukraine?

• How can the Ukrainian case adopt this discourse theory?

The discourse theory is represented within different scientific traditions. Poststructuralist tradition of discourse analysis has strongly influenced political science, including theories of international relations, European identities and mass media analysis.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is the part of the second generation of discourse theories. Norman Fairclough, who is considered to be the main developer of this approach, views the discourse as one of the modes of domination or regulation of subordinate relations of social actors [1]. Jacques Derrida’s maximalist formula: “Everything is a discourse” is taken as a basis. Poststructuralist discourse analysis intellectually originates from the works of Antonio Gramsci, Mikhail Bakhtin, Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, and Jacques Lacan where the discourse is analysed as the total of social practices, within which senses and meanings are reproduced. Social practices formulate discursive event, and at the same time, discursive event formulates them. The notion of “speech act” is central to CDA and it disproves the understanding of language and action as being separately existent. The current theory accepts the statement of Richard McKay Rorty, who said that truth was not the characteristic of the outer world but it was the characteristic of language [2]. Truth is the product of discursive constructing.

In poststructuralist discourse theory it is essentially historicist view of the identity formation which is situated at the forefront. It is claimed that an identity is formed during its positioning against other purported phenomena. This way, for example, the meaning of the notion “socialism” can be revealed only in comparison with such notions as “liberalism”, “conservatism”, “fascism” and others. The comprehension of the meaning of notions is held to imply the examination of contexts and of interpretation techniques.

Currently there is a tendency towards widening the subject field of discourse theories which is done by means of shifting focal point from topics related to the studying of identity policies (national, gender etc.), to the issues which are traditional for political science – research of public administration, political reforms, strategies, ideologies and so forth. The main notions of CDA are: power, class, discrimination, interests, institutes, social structure, and social order.

The methodology of CDA consists of three stages. At the first stage (description) a researcher divides a text into sentences / propositions and groups them defining the links. At the second stage (interpretation) the researcher correlates the text with the activities making assumptions about the details. At the third stage (explanation) he/she makes an evaluation, taking into account the social context of the speech acts.

Compared to other approaches, the CDA method doesn’t have any strictly defined procedures of data collection and analysis; these two processes are determined personally by the researcher. Thus the interpretation of the data entails potential subjectivity of the scientist.

However CDA has many more advantages than flows. This method does not involve sophisticated procedure of data gathering, materials are accessible via the Internet and within media space. This method is economic: it doesn’t demand material expenditures, only the author’s eagerness. It is possible to check, supplement, confirm or refute its findings with the help of any other analytical instrument. CDA implies analyses of huge amounts of textual data; it gives a possibility to analyse data directly, thereby setting political scientists free from traditional accusations of performing secondary analysis and data interpretation. Moreover, CDA gives a possibility to smooth over the difference between qualitative and quantitative orientation of scientific methodology.

Being employed in the domain of “political”, discourse analysis faces the most conservative manifestations of “traditional science”. Analysis of political discourse is not a heavily formalized discipline and it functions as an interdisciplinary methodological approach which integrates theories and practices of political text analysis. It is hardly expectable that “professional political scientist” would stop at the level of grammatical forms, etc. and will prevent themselves from broader generalization. Till we continue to position ourselves as historians, political scientists and sociologists, texts will be used in “utilitarian” manner and “border-line disciplines” would be labelled as additional. In fact, this is how one of the dimensions of the inter-disciplinarian approach, which entails existence of disciplinary boundaries, displays itself. Nonetheless, political discourse analysis is capable of enriching the research tool kit of professional historians, sociologists and political scientists via the usage of linguistic methods of text analysis in “socio-oriented” researches.

CDA Studies in Russia and Ukraine: common approach

Nowadays in the Russian and Ukrainian political science about two dozen articles have been built by using CDA as a main methodology, including international relations. The quantity of these works is growing fast, too. So, we can talk about some sort of a “fashion” on CDA amongst political scientists from post-communist countries who want to reject Marxism, but find something more or less close to habitual approach.

In Russia periodical journals play an important role. In the “Polis” (“Political Studies”) there is a regular column called “Political discourse.” Around it a broad network of researchers of the discourse was founded. In 2003 a thematic issue of another magazine – “Political science” – was also carried out. The most important centre of the discourse is the almanac “Discourse PI” which contributed significantly to the development of discourse analysis. In the framework of all-Russian Congress of political scientists (2003) a special round table on political discourse was held, and in 2006 there was a special session. It turns out that this branch of political science in Russia is developing successfully. A similar picture we can see in Ukraine.

Moving to some samples of papers with using discourse analysis methods we should refer to the article of A. Khmeltsov (Yaroslavl) “When “They” speak About “Us”: Political Discourse Analysis And Semiotics of Foreign Policy In an Interdisciplinary Perspective” [3]. This text is an attempt to generally characterize PDA. It highlights the most important dimensions and levels of discourse description with respect to foreign policy discourse and parliamentary discourse. It offers insight into the variety of approaches ranging from cognitive discourse analysis (T.A. van Dijk) [4] to more text oriented PDA (P.Chilton, C. Schaffner) [5].

The research object is the political image of Vladimir Putin in the discourse of Russian and American mass-media. On the basis of the conducted complex analysis of texts in newspaper publications the author distinguished the using of the specific vocabulary of mass-media: “beasts”, “humanitarian catastrophe”, “democratic mode”, “mafia”, “Zionists”, “freemasons”, “reddish-brown”, “anti-Semites”, “corruption”, “state-derelict”, “axis of evil”, “light distances of communism”, “expansion”, “aggression”, “discrimination”, etc. The expressions do not serve as means of creation of the vivid system, as in the language of fiction, this means of suggestion and affecting addressee: metonymy (“East”, “West”, “London”, “Paris”); metaphor (“hawks”, “pigeons”, “seed of enmity”, “drive in a trap”); puns (“dangerous safety”, “disconnected association”, “calculations and miscalculations”, “normalization”); euphemisms (“take measure”, “peace enforcement operations”, “hostilities”, “anti-terrorist campaign”, “humanitarian interference”, “limit contingent”); periphrasis (“cradle of revolution”, “motherland of president”) [6].

The analysis allowed to educe the next dominants from the political image of Putin created in the Russian mass-media: a patriot, a servant of people, the election of the people, the voice of the people, a simple man; an owner, a strong hand; a hard worker, an energetic person; a brave man; a fighter for social justice, a wise leader, a prophet military, a fighter against oligarchs, a fighter against terrorism, a caring son, an excellent family man; an attractive man, a modest man, a sex-symbol. In American mass-media there are other lexical dominants of image: a nationalist, a pragmatist, a patriot popular among the people; an authoritarian leader, tsar, a despot, hunter of oligarchs; an enigmatic man, a spy; a strong politician, a stable politician, a fighter against terrorism, a clever man [7]. So, this article serves as an example of how perfectly a Russian author can focus on the problem of inter-disciplinarity with respect to both, current linguistic approaches to political discourse as well as CDA.

The next work belongs to Alexsander Strelnikov (Yekaterinburg University). “A Portrait of Vladimir Putin in the discourse of presidential campaign 2004” presents the metaphorical evaluation of the portrait of a candidate for president. There are evaluations that the portrait of Putin expresses optimism and.

A candidate appears before the electorate in the character of a strong, clever, handsome ruler with the handsome and divinity showing in infallibility. The great popularity of Putin is possible to be explained in texts, from one side, that in times of the realization of pre-election agitation he has already been an incumbent president for four years; on the other hand he has administrative resource. In most cases it is the infrequent criticism towards Putin levelled by the abundance of positive estimations within the framework of one publication. Other qualities of the candidates for president that are meaningful for the electors in Russia are: honesty and decency, support by the majority of the population in the country, accordance to the norms, intellectual development, high political status, professionalism, external attractiveness, ability to bring a benefit to the country, luck [8]. Strelnikov’s article is one of the best interdisciplinary works for the past few years.

Perhaps the best and most fruitful example of CDA in Russia and Ukraine is the book “Identities and Politics during Putin Presidency”, edited by Philipp Casula, and Jeronim Perovic with a foreword by Heiko Haumann. This collective monograph was written by researchers from different countries united by their adherence to CDA.

Editors insist on that “this book unlike others considers Russia’s developments mainly against the background of poststructuralist discourse theoretical approaches. Discourse theory and analysis are meant to compliment, not to replace the transformation theory. Introducing poststructuralist and constructivist elements into transformation theory also means releasing it from the grip of a normative and largely Western-centred transitology… If we shift the focus of research to political and national identities, at least 3 questions deducted from poststructuralist theories need to be addressed: How do these collective identities emerge? How do they change? How do they achieve stability?” [9]. “These 3 questions make the basic theoretical assumption of this discourse theory clear: collective (and personal) identities are never completely stable or fixed. They are subject to change, negotiation, and reshaping. With this strong focus on identity formation, dissolution, and fixation, we believe that CDA leaves us well equipped to analyze Russian identity formation – and also get a better sense of what we have referred to as the essence of Russia’s stability” [10].

Helpful in this regard are Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s works (Laclau E., Mouffe C. 2001. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics; Laclau E. 2005. On Populist Reason), which propose a theory of discourse, ideology, universality, and hegemony that allow us to grasp the processes of transformation and to understand the kind of stability created during this process. Hegemony was described as a situation of antagonism and domination; but hegemonic domination is always contingent, and the boundaries that separate the antagonistic forces are unstable. Hegemony is power that is accepted through identification with the source of power and challenged by means of drawing a boundary between the “oppressors” and the “oppressed’.

According to Laclau E., Mouffe C. (2001), “the practice of articulation, as fixation/dislocation of the system of differences, cannot consist of purely linguistic phenomena; but must instead pierce the entire material density of the multifarious institutions, rituals and practices through which a discursive formation is structured” [11]. Dislocation is celebrated in the poststructuralist tradition as preventing structural closure and therefore creating the possibility of liberation.

Olga Malinova (Prof., Moscow State Institute of International Relations), in the article “Russian Political Discourse in the 1990s: Crisis of Identity and Conflicting Pluralism of Ideas” wrote about crisis of identity 1) as a result of the sharp conflict over the interpretations of basic concepts on which the definition of this notion could rely, 2) as a struggle of competing discourses for the establishment of the new hegemony [12]. In her conclusions Olga Malinova wrote: “Putin could admit some ideas from the repertoire of Communists and ‘Patriots’ that were taboo for ‘Democrats’. In this way he could mobilize ‘consent’ by appealing to values and symbols from the Soviet past. The new, comprehensive official discourse tended to reduce tensions between competing models of collective identity by mixing their elements in eclectic construction. At the same time, it rejected the extreme versions of competing models. Stabilization of discourse was achieved not only due to the development of a more ‘fitting’ discourse about collective identity, but also because of the establishment of control under the ‘core’ of public sphere as a result of the political reforms of Putin” [13].

Ivan Kurilla (Prof., Volgograd State University) in “The Symbolic Politics of Putin Administration” described the Russian political discourse, in which “some Soviet elements were maintained, outlasted the Yeltsin period, and emerged anew quite recently under Vladimir Putin: discourse theory would frame this process as the “dislocation” of a hegemonic discourse, followed by hegemonic struggles and the renegotiation of values and symbols, eventually resulting in a new hegemonic discourse. The demand for the articulation of a new symbolic landscape was present by the late 1990s in many competing discourses; however, it was Vladimir Putin who became the voice of the new approach and reaped the benefits of its introduction” [14]. Some of the most important steps were: the exiling of the former media magnates Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky; the legislation to re-introduce the old Soviet anthem with slightly updated lyrics; and a return to the tsarist state symbols such as the double-headed eagle [15]. The current symbolic universe seems very firm, which lives us with the more cautious expectation that it will be modestly embellished, rather than totally changed.

Viatcheslav Morozov (Ass. Prof., School of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University) in his article “Sovereignty and Democracy in Contemporary Russia: A Modern Subject Faces the Post-Modern World” explores the origins of the restorationist neo-Soviet turn in Russian identity politics. This article looks into how the notions of sovereignty and democracy fit into and help reproduce the discursive reality of Putin’s Russia, and examines the challenges Russia faces in its attempts to (re-)establish itself as a sovereign subject.

“At the global level the Kremlin attempts to redefine democracy as a truly universal value to be emancipated from Western hegemonic control. This criticism indicates a significant degree of dislocation existing in Russian domestic and global hegemonic structures. Dislocation can provoke securitizing practices that lead back to a structural closure, but it can also provide foundations for emancipatory politics, if and when there is a subject willing to liberate itself” [16]. So, in the Russian case the dominant theme of the official discourse is sovereign autonomy, which presupposes the ability of the state to control all significant domestic and transnational processes in and involving Russia [17].

“The identity of Putin’s Russia crucially depends on the negation of Yeltsin’s ‘democracy’ as a period of chaos and destruction. Why, then, does Putin still speak about democracy with respect, and why does his team try to save Russia’s democratic reputation by playing with the slogan of ‘sovereign democracy’? This paradox must tell us something about the structures of the power in today’s world which have turned ‘democracy’ into a norm and make any deviations subject to punishment” [18].

The fact that democracy today comes close to being universally accepted as a point of reference is a result of the hegemonic position of one particular subject of history – the West. Drawing a boundary between the West and “us” is often a constitutive exercise for the non-Western communities. Fully in accordance with the logic of hegemony, the boundary between the West and any of the non-Wests is seldom absolute. While challenging Western dominance, leaders all over the world subscribe to the idea of democracy as the only legitimate form of government and refer to the West as setting the standards for this from. At the same time, as Western hegemony consolidates, the communities that are (self-) excluded from the West feel an ever more pressing need to define their identity in opposition to the dominant Western “other”, which makes the West even more real as a subject of global politics [19].

Lev Gudkov (sociologist, director of Levada Center, Prof., High School of Economy in Moscow) in the paper “Russian Nationalism and Xenophobia” concluded that xenophobia is an extreme feature of Russian nationalism. In the context of instability, tension, and social disintegration, the most meaningful collective values erode and earlier mechanisms of cultural reproduction become paralyzed. Thus, primitive forms and means of maintaining a collective “us” arise from the bottom of social life and begin to replace central tenets of societal self-definition. Among main features of Russian nationalism author sow: 1) the conviction of the primacy of the Russians over other peoples making up the “empire”; 2) pride in the belief that Russians are an empire-forming nation, and therefore have specific priorities and privileges in leadership, army, economy, education; 3) militarism and army, support for various forms of geopolitical expansion, attempts to keep control over the former area of the socialist camp; 4) the idea of an organic unity of all Russians, as identified by blood and historical destiny; 5) isolationism, anti-western sentiments [20].

Andrey Makarychev (Civil Service Academy, Nizhny Novgorod) in his work “Russia in Plural: (Re-) Constructing Otherness, (De-) Constructing Power” had the goal to uncover the ways in which cultural discourses contribute to a variety of political articulations that are constitutive for identity construction in Russia. Makarychev insists that “the more or less liberal attitude of the Kremlin towards the variety of discourses generated outside of the locus of power is a strong argument against those who deem that practices of the bygone Soviet era are constitutive for today’s Russian politics…Ruling elite is keen to take advantage of a growing variety of narratives and representations across the entire range of Russia’s cultural life” [21].

Hegemonic discourse is understood as being grounded in such signifiers as “sovereign democracy”, “the vertical of power’, “unity”, “patriotism”, “Putin’s plan”, “national projects”, “energy superpower” [22]. “Of course, the Russian state wishes to control intellectual and ideational practices emanating from the outside of the political elite and to use them for its own purposes; however, there are always “deviant languages” of identity-building” [23]. Thus, the picture of identity moulding consists of a “grand narrative” of the Kremlin and a multiplicity of “small narratives” that infuse more ambiguity, indeterminacy, and uncertainty into the efforts of explaining what Russian identity is [24].

Sergii Glebov (Ass. Prof., Odessa Mechnikov National University) in his work “Constructing or Deconstructing Democracy? The Geopolitical Context of Ukraine’s Democratic Choice” stressed that Ukraine’s democratization is to be seen in the context of a geopolitical choice between two different models – Western and Russian. Among his interesting conclusions there are some about the real meaning of Russia – West talks when they pretend to talk about Ukraine. “If Putin declares that he loves Russia, he is a nationalist, retreating from the Western democratic achievements. If Yushchenko declares his devotion to Ukraine, he is a patriot fighting for the independence of Ukraine from Russia and the establishment of democracy. The perception in Russia is quite different. If Putin loves Russia, he is a patriot; if Yushchenko loves Ukraine, he is a betrayer of Slavic brotherhood with Russia and nationalist who hates Russians. It turns out that Ukraine is merely one element in a larger geopolitical game”[25].

Analysing some articles from this book we should remember the author’s country of origin. One of our aims was demonstration of common features and differences between them despite the fact that they use the same method CDA. In most of the cases this difference is not clear, that is a good argument in favour of CDA methodology. But in the case of Andrey Makarychev’s political views of the author they prevail over the scientific ones. His desire to prove “liberal attitude of Kremlin” and strong difference between the authorities of the Soviet era and the ones nowadays, still remains without convincing arguments.

Sample of CDA Studies in Ukraine: “European idea” in Ukraine: Political Discussions in Verkhovna Rada on the Eve of Vilnius Summit (2013)

The aim of this paper was to explore how the speeches and arguments delivered by politicians in Ukraine’s public sphere create “European” discourse, and what the special features of this discourse are, especially in the sphere of a foreign policy choice. The peculiarity of Ukraine has always been a contradiction between pro-Western and pro-Eastern views. Therefore this partition was widely used by Ukrainian politicians for their own goals. Among the main research questions are: 1) How can the discourse theory be adapted to the Ukrainian case? 2) What are the specifics reflecting “Europe” and “European values” in Ukraine? 3) What is the perception of Europe among the political parties and in the society? 4) What content of the messages dominates in the discussions of the politicians on such matters as the European project? 5) Is it correct to associate pro-Western politicians with the “democratic discourse” and pro-Eastern politicians with the authoritarian one?

With the purpose of fulfilling our own tasks we tried to describe the perspectives which the employment of CDA has in the sphere of analyses of European discourse within the context of parliamentary debates in Ukraine during 2013. Such dating of materials is accounted for our interest to debates which took place right on the eve of “Maydan” protests, after the beginning of which all parliamentary disputes faded into insignificance.

In the public speeches of the opposition representatives (“Batkivshina”, “UDAR”, “Svoboda”), discussion over the European topic didn’t take manifold forms and one can say it even went in “utilitarian” manner – only within the context of the European integration of Ukraine. So we shall pass to the study of the variants of how the European idea sounded in the speeches of the oppositional members of Ukrainian Parliament.

The first variant was when domestic problems were highlighted. In this variant of speeches it was often stated that Ukraine would have all of its problems solved if it joined Europe and if not – then it would get stuck for ages.

The second variant was the critics towards the authorities. Civil servants in Europe can’t behave this way! All of the oppositional representatives were unanimous concerning this issue; they all tried to criticize the authorities as often as possible. It was worth noting that the opposition members strived to get support and approval on the part of the EU representatives; in this respect their attention was concentrated on officials from Brussels: thus the importance of negotiating with the representatives of the European national authorities, let alone broader intellectual society of Europe, was disregarded. In general it is not clear whether they, and Ukrainians at large, differentiate “Europe” and “European Union”. It seems that the answer is negative.

The third variant – the comparison of Ukrainian and European developmental levels with the emphasis of the latter’s advantage. This was done in a very broad manner without going into the depth of the issue. Instead of being viewed and shown as the real developmental model, Europe was presented as some kind of an ideal myth. Nobody of the opposition members tried to tell Ukrainians: “we understand that they do have problems too, but at the moment it is much more important for us to use their experience of democratic reforms.” In general the word “democracy” was used more and more rarely and the word “liberalism” vanished from the Ukrainian political vocabulary. Instead “European integration” was used at any given occasion and it was imagined as a final goal rather than the tool of further development.

There were lots of tag-phrases common to all the oppositionists which were continually used in the speeches: strategic boundary, strategic choice, geopolitical choice, European choice, European standards, high standards, decent life, responsibility, political will, “we want progress, we want achievements, we want victory”, “freedom to Ukrainian people – freedom in free Europe”, “we know the way we should go”, “we are ready for everything”, “we will take Ukraine to the European civilized way” [26].

As for the ruling party and its parliamentary representatives, the opposition members often addressed them using rude words such as “bandits, morass, screech, leaves without figs, spinning of the money”. Also peculiar was the fact that the sentences were built in a specific way in order to emphasize the speaker’s disdain and even disgust towards their opponents: “all this”, “this Rada”, “this president”, “these tales of the President”, “the Party of Regions is telling stories”, “dishonoured deputies” , and so on. The main conclusion: “we are opposition and we are longing to join civilized Europe, as concerns the authorities – it is the lowest level and the ‘Russian fifth column’” [27].

Turning to the Russian factor within the development of the European discourse, it was worth noting that this was the part of the discourse in which the authorities-opposition confrontation was most evident.

The Party of Regions called Russian Federation was the natural historical partner of Ukraine. The opposition was set against Moscow and it put forward very distinct conflict of two ideas – of Russia or Europe. Nevertheless the reasoning was surprisingly weak with the same words being virtually repeated from one speech to another, and all the parties were much more unanimous in this issue than in the others. It is even difficult to distinguish the speeches delivered by the representatives of “Svoboda” and “Batkivschyna” with the latter using the vocabulary of “Svoboda”. They all admitted that for Ukraine, Russia means surrender of the national interests, the gas dependence, the ideological expansion, the unavailability of accession to Euro-Atlantic structures.

Last but not the least the part of the parliamentary talks related to the European discourse correlates with the following question: does Ukraine have the national idea and if it does, then what is the way it may be phrased? There was not even the slightest mention in the speeches of the Party of Regions members of the term “national idea”. At the same time the oppositional parties developed this issue in varying degrees; “Batkivschina” had the most elaborated variant and evidently it took the leading position as far as the formulation and exploitation of the European idea as a tool of the struggle for power was concerned.

That way the Ukrainian national idea, which is virtually the same for each nation – seeking of security and prosperity, was once again articulated by Ukrainians, as well as ages before, in the form of the geopolitical choice between being rich and protected by Europe or poor and oppressed by Russia.

Parliamentary debates within merely one year – 2013 – represent extensive material for the study of modern myths and illusions which dominate the public consciousness and which are used by the political elites in their struggle for power. They are also try to detect and use protest moods in the society; the analysis has shown that the growing activity of the MPs was directly related to the street actions (there were 2 waves in 2013: in April and November).

№	Issue discussed in the speeches of oppositional MPs	Percentage
1	Internal Ukrainian problems and the EU	5
2	The critics of authorities and the EU	30
3	Comparison of the European and Ukrainian developmental levels	5
4	Russian factor within the process of the European integration of Ukraine	15
5	Ukrainian national idea: the European element	15

So we have discerned five main issues which lie at the core of all speeches of the opposition members in which the European discourse is concerned. The analysis shows that the first place is firmly occupied by the contraposition of the European integration idea to the current Ukrainian authorities. The second place is shared by the idea of historic belonging of Ukraine to the European civilization and by contraposition of the latter to the Russian influence.

We should admit the following most important omissions in the speeches of the opposition members. The term “values” stayed extremely unpopular with Ukrainian politicians though it had no relation to the solving of real problems within the public consciousness. Ukrainians mainly embraced only one type of values – those related to their individual life (family, health etc.). All the more alien are the perceptions and debates on the issue of the “European values”; probably the opposition representatives did not support the public discussion of the “European values” on purpose, keeping in mind that traditional Ukrainian society is dominated by the illiberal views.

The main sense of exploitation of the European discourse in the parliament was prosy: the EU was perceived as the mythical power which was able to relieve Ukrainians from long-standing poverty and oppression.

In the speeches of Ukrainian politicians the contraposition of “Europe-Russia” was used most frequently. It was implied in this context that “Europe” is synonymous to the “West” and “Russia” – to the “East”. Russia pursued anti-Western and anti-European policy. Hence those who support conclusion of an alliance with Russia were automatically considered to be in opposition to the West, Europe and the EU. In the interviews shown on the national TV, the Russian-speaking representatives of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea expressed univocal anti-EU position explicitly declaring that those who wanted to join the EU were welcome to do this but Crimea did not intend to follow them. This was an unambiguous provocation aimed at the breakup of the state [28].

The research of the political vocabulary of the oppositional leaders enables us to conclude that populism is a characteristic which is common for all of them. Putting it simply, they articulate only those thoughts which, in their eyes, are supported by the voters. Furthermore parliamentary speeches serve to change the images of the oppositional leaders which are already rooted in the mass consciousness: Yatsenyuk tries to position himself as a strong, decisive and hard-line fighter; Klychko instead tries to show publicly that he is an intelligent and serious-minded politician and Tyahnybok keenly avoids radical statements which could affirm his strive for creation of “Ukraine for Ukrainians”. As a result, parliamentary disputes were used to expose political principles and positions to a lesser extent than they were used to disguise them.

Thus the veracity of the pro-Western and pro-European longings of the opposition appears to be questionable. However even more important question arises: is it correct to associate pro-Western politicians with the “democratic discourse” and pro-Eastern politicians with the authoritarian one? It seems that it is possible to answer positively and not only due to the fact that the presidency of the leader of pro-Eastern politicians Victor Yanukovych proved that the turn to authoritarianism in 2013 was more real than ever. The phenomenon of “Svoboda” is equally interesting. On the one hand this party was an important element of the Ukrainian opposition to Yanukovych, which sought support of the EU, but on the other hand, this political power has anti-Western and anti-liberal ideological roots and as a result it is prone to authoritarianism.

Summing up the conclusions of the research it should be said that political discussions in Verkhovna Rada on the eve of the Vilnius Summit have shown that the usage of the “European idea” in Ukraine was widespread but it was not profound; the opposition members were using it on the ad hoc basis in their struggle with the ruling party and hence with the parliamentary majority. Though on the international arena “Batkivschina” and “UDAR” cooperate with centre-right political parties of Europe technically speaking they have not yet become the European parties (with respective program principles and systems of values). A serious challenge for the future development of Ukraine is the radicalization of both right and left wings of the political spectrum with the centre remaining weak and disunited.

Conclusions

Thus the CDA has a number of advantages: 1) it can eliminate the contradiction between qualitative and quantitative orientation of scientific methods; 2) it does not require complicated procedures for the data collection; 3) it is very economical; 4) any other analytical tool allows you to check its results; 5) it involves large amounts of textual material, which allows direct analysis of data, eliminating from allegations of secondary data analysis and interpretation. In the discipline of International Relations using CDA gives an opportunity to convert the study from meta-level to the level of discursive practices. It also gives a possibility to overcome the artificial division of spheres of internal and foreign policy.

The CDA is especially an appropriate methodological tool since it is aimed at the exploration of the relations of inequality, of social tensions and ideological substitution, which are used by the elites in order to consolidate their power. In general all this constitutes the essence of social relations in Ukraine where the most ancient law in the history of manhood still functions: the power is the property.

Several studies using CDA appeared in Russia and Ukraine in the recent years. There are more works with using CDA in Russia than in Ukraine. The explanation ties with the bigger role of Russian periodical journals and all-Russian congresses of political scientists.

For understanding the role of CDA its clear interdisciplinary perspective is important. The discourse theory and analysis are meant to compliment, not to replace transformation theory. Critical discourse analysis is the part of the second generation of discourse theories. The theory of discourse, ideology, universality, and hegemony is one of the most valuable parts of the CDA today. Hegemony is described as a situation of antagonism and domination; this suits modern and especially post-communist realities very well.

Russian and Ukrainian researchers through studying tag-phrases and specific vocabulary of mass-media pay attention first of all to problems of political elite, political image; sovereignty and democracy, democratization; identity formation, dissolution, and fixation; identity politics, crisis of identity, nationalism and xenophobia; cultural life, intellectual and ideational practices.

Special part of CDA studies today remain its adoption for International Relations. Researchers focus on studying geopolitical game in post-Soviet space, two different models of development – Western and Russian, foreign policy choices.

Referances:

[1] Fairclough, Norman (1989). Language and Power. London: Longman.

[2] Rorty, Richard McKay (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[3] A. Khmeltsov (Yaroslavl) “When “They” speak About “Us”: Political Discourse Analysis And Semiotics of Foreign Policy In an Interdisciplinary Perspective”. Хмельцов, А. (2004). “Когда “они” говорят о “нас”: политический дискурс-анализ и семиотика внешней политики в междисциплинарной перспективе”. B Актуальные проблемы теории коммуникации, 59–71. СПб.: СПбГПУ.

[4] Van Dijk, T. (2006). Discourse and Manipulation. In: Discourse & Society. Vol 17(2), pp. 359–383.

[5] Chilton, P. and C. Schäffner (2002). Introduction: Themes and Principles in the Analysis of Political Discourse. In P. Chilton and C. Schäffner (eds.), Politics as Text and Talk. Approaches to Political Discourse. 1–41.Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

[6] Хмельцов, А. (2004). Когда “они” говорят о “нас”: политический дискурс-анализ и семиотика внешней политики в междисциплинарной перспективе”. B Актуальные проблемы теории коммуникации, 59–71. СПб.: СПбГПУ.

[7] Хмельцов, А. (2004). Когда “они” говорят о “нас”: политический дискурс-анализ и семиотика внешней политики в междисциплинарной перспективе”. B Актуальные проблемы теории коммуникации, 59–71. СПб.: СПбГПУ.

[8] Стрельников, Александр (2004). Оценочный портрет В. В. Путина в дискурсе кампании по выборам президента в России 2004 года. B Лингвистика: Бюллетень Уральского лингвистического общества, 81–90. Екатеринбург: Уральский гос. пед. университет.

[9] Perovic, J., Casula, Ph. (2009) The Stabilization of Russia During the Putin Presidency: Critical Reflections. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Philipp P. Casula, and Jeronim Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 25.

[10] Perovic, J., Casula, Ph. (2009) The Stabilization of Russia During the Putin Presidency: Critical Reflections. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Philipp P. Casula, and Jeronim Perovic, 19-Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 26.

[11] Malinova, Olga (2009). Russian Political Discourse in the 1990s: Crisis of Identity and Conflicting Pluralism of Ideas. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Philipp Casula, and Jeronim Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 95.

[12] Malinova, Olga (2009). Russian Political Discourse in the 1990s: Crisis of Identity and Conflicting Pluralism of Ideas. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Philipp Casula, and Jeronim Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 94.

[13] Malinova, Olga (2009). Russian Political Discourse in the 1990s: Crisis of Identity and Conflicting Pluralism of Ideas. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Philipp Casula, and Jeronim Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 108.

[14] Kurilla, Ivan (2009). The Symbolic Politics of the Putin Administration. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 256.

[15] Kurilla, Ivan (2009). The Symbolic Politics of the Putin Administration. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 257.

[16] Morozov, Viatcheslav (2009). Sovereignty and Democracy in Contemporary Russia: A Modern Subject Faces the Post-Modern World. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 198.

[17] Morozov, Viatcheslav (2009). Sovereignty and Democracy in Contemporary Russia: A Modern Subject Faces the Post-Modern World. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 223.

[18] Morozov, Viatcheslav (2009). Sovereignty and Democracy in Contemporary Russia: A Modern Subject Faces the Post-Modern World. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 203.

[19] Morozov, Viatcheslav (2009). Sovereignty and Democracy in Contemporary Russia: A Modern Subject Faces the Post-Modern World. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 217.

[20] Gudkov, Lev (2009). Russian Nationalism and Xenophobia. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 169.

[21] Makarychev, Andrey (2009). Russia in Plural: (Re)Constructing Otherness, (De)Constructing Power. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 293.

[22] Makarychev, Andrey (2009). Russia in Plural: (Re)Constructing Otherness, (De)Constructing Power. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 295.

[23] Makarychev, Andrey (2009). Russia in Plural: (Re)Constructing Otherness, (De)Constructing Power. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 309.

[24] Makarychev, Andrey (2009). Russia in Plural: (Re)Constructing Otherness, (De)Constructing Power. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 310.

[25] Glebov, Sergii (2009). Constructing or Deconstructing Democracy? The Geopolitical Context of Ukraine’s Democratic Choice. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, p. 385.

[26] Brusylovska, Olga (2014). “European idea” in Ukraine: Political Discussions in Verkhovna Rada on the Eve of Vilnius Summit (2013). In Constructing “Europe” and spread of European values. Selected articles, ed. by L. Mazylis, 29–46. Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University.

[27] Brusylovska, Olga (2014). “European idea” in Ukraine: Political Discussions in Verkhovna Rada on the Eve of Vilnius Summit (2013). In Constructing “Europe” and spread of European values. Selected articles, ed. by L. Mazylis, 29–46. Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University.

[28] Brusylovska, Olga (2014). “European idea” in Ukraine: Political Discussions in Verkhovna Rada on the Eve of Vilnius Summit (2013). In Constructing “Europe” and spread of European values. Selected articles, ed. by L. Mazylis, 29–46. Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University.

Bibliography:

1. Стрельников, Александр (2004). “Оценочный портрет В. В. Путина в дискурсе кампании по выборам президента в России 2004 года”. B Лингвистика: Бюллетень Уральского лингвистического общества, 81–90. Екатеринбург: Уральский гос. пед. университет.

2. Хмельцов, А. (2004). Когда “они” говорят о “нас”: политический дискурс-анализ и семиотика внешней политики в междисциплинарной перспективе. B Актуальные проблемы теории коммуникации, 59–71. СПб: СПбГПУ.

3. Brusylovska, Olga (2014). “European idea” in Ukraine: Political Discussions in Verkhovna Rada on the Eve of Vilnius Summit (2013). In Constructing “Europe” and spread of European values. Selected articles, ed. by L. Mazylis, 29–46. Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University.

4. Chilton, P. and C. Schäffner (2002). Introduction: Themes and Principles in the Analysis of Political Discourse. In P. Chilton and C. Schäffner (eds.), Politics as Text and Talk. Approaches to Political Discourse. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. pp. 1–41.

5. Fairclough, Norman (1989). Language and Power. London: Longman.

6. Glebov, Sergii (2009). Constructing or Deconstructing Democracy? The Geopolitical Context of Ukraine’s Democratic Choice. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, 376-389. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag.

7. Gudkov, Lev (2009). Russian Nationalism and Xenophobia. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, 158–175. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag.

8. Kurilla, Ivan (2009). The Symbolic Politics of the Putin Administration. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, 255–269. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag.

9. Makarychev, Andrey (2009). Russia in Plural: (Re)Constructing Otherness, (De)Constructing Power. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, 292-312. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag.

10. Malinova, Olga (2009). Russian Political Discourse in the 1990s: Crisis of Identity and Conflicting Pluralism of Ideas. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Philipp Casula, and Jeronim Perovic, 94–111. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag.

11. Morozov, Viatcheslav (2009). Sovereignty and Democracy in Contemporary Russia: A Modern Subject Faces the Post-Modern World. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Ph. Casula, and J. Perovic, 198–234. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag.

12. Perovic, J., Casula, Ph. (2009) The Stabilization of Russia During the Putin Presidency: Critical Reflections. In Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency, edited by Philipp P. Casula, and Jeronim Perovic, 19–30. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag.

13. Rorty, Richard McKay (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

14. Van Dijk, Tewn. (2006). Discourse and Manipulation. In: Discourse & Society. Vol 17(2), pp. 359–383.